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CASE SUMMARY
VOIR DIRE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION UNDER A
"COMPARATIVE JUROR ANALYSIS"
IN KESSER v. CAMBRA
INTRODUCTION

In Kesser v. Cambra, the en banc Ninth Circuit panel held that a
California State Prosecutor's justifications for peremptory challenges
during jury voir dire were pretexts. for purposeful discrimination. I The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the California Court of Appeal failed to
apply the proper Supreme Court test under Batson v. Kentuckl to
determine whether the prosecutor's nonracial motives were pretextua1. 3
Applying a "comparative juror analysis" (comparing the characteristics
of a stricken juror with an impaneled juror), the Ninth Circuit majority
held that the California Court of Appeal improperly relied solely on the
prosecutor's own self-serving testimony as to his race-neutral reasons. 4
By contrast, the concurring and dissenting opinions argued that a pure
"comparative juror analysis" was not prescribed by Supreme Court
precedent and offered alternative approaches. s
1.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following their convictions of fIrst degree murder and sentences to
life in prison without parole, defendants Richard Kesser and (wife)
Jennifer Leahy sought a writ of habeas corpus to the Ninth Circuit "on
Kesser v. Cambra 465 F.3d 351, 353 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358.
4 1d.
I

2 Batson

5 See

infra notes 77 -1 04 and accompanying text.
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the grounds that the prosecutor struck potential jurors on the basis of
their race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.,,6 The prosecutor struck three Native American women and
one Asian woman. 7
At the defendant's request, the trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and summoned the prosecutor to explain the reasoning behind
his strikes. 8 The prosecutor explained that Debra Rindels, the first
Native American woman to be challenged, was stricken because she
worked for a tribe and he feared she was "inclined to favor Native
American culture and institutions over 'the mainstream system'" and that
"Native Americans were 'resistive' and 'suspicious' of the criminal
justice system.,,9 He rated Ms. Rindels a "c" overall, finding her to be
"pretentious," "self-important," "somewhat unstable, fairly weak, and
some[one] who ... would be easily swayed by the defense.,,10
Regarding Theresa Lawton, a second Native American woman, the
prosecutor explained that he rated Ms. Lawton a "C minus" overall
because he perceived her to be "weak" and uneducated. 11 In addition, he
was concerned with her commute to court, given the winter conditions,
and did not want to disrupt the flow of the proceedings if roads were
closed.1 2 Ultimately, he made the determination that she was not a good
juror for the Kesser case. 13
Finally, the prosecutor explained that he excused the last Native
6 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 353, 356 (9th Cir. 2006). Richard Kesser, his wife,
Jennifer Leahy, and a friend, Stephen Chiara, were convicted of first degree murder under the theory
that Kesser and Leahy hired Chiara to kill Kesser's ex-wife so that the couple could collect the
insurance proceeds. [d. at 356. The couple was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. [d.
7 [d. at 353.
8/d. People v. Wheeler is California's equivalent of Batson v. Kentucky, holding that
purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (rejected by
Johnson v. California. 545 u.s. 162 (2005), to the extent Wheeler conflicts with federal law); see
also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Wheeler held that the use of peremptory challenges to
remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates article I, section 16, of the
California Constitution. See Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 761-62. To the extent the Wheeler standard
differs from Batson, the federal rule controls. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005).
9 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 353.
10 [d. at 353-54. "The prosecutor indicated that he made notes and gave grades from a high
of A to a low of F based on his impression of the questionnaire filled out by the venire panel,
responses during voir dire, and what transpired at the hardship proceeding." See id. at 378 (Rymer,
J., dissenting).
II [d. at 354-55. The prosecutor elaborated that he viewed Ms. Lawton as "weak" given her
admission during voir dire that she would have a hard time answering out loud if the Court
questioned her on her verdict. Id.
12 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,354 (9th Cir. 2006).
13 1d. at 355.
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American woman, Carla Smithfield, for hardship and had rated her a "c"
overall. 14 Ms. Smithfield emphasized during voir dire that the trial
would be a hardship to her given her position as a teacher of two year old
children because the children were very attached to her and she could not
think of anyone to take her place during the trial. 15
Following the prosecutor's explanations, defense counsel expressed
particular concern with the challenge against Debra Rindels, arguing that
it was a "classic example of ... a presumption of a group bias based on a
stereotype membership in a racial group . . . .,,16 The trial court,
however, found sufficient justification to support all of the peremptory
challenges and held that Debra Rindels was dismissed because she
worked for a tribe, not because she was a member of the tribe. 17 The
Ninth Circuit noted, however, that the trial court "did not evaluate the
sincerity of the prosecutor's nonracial responses because it did not find
any racial animus that would prompt further inquiry.,,18
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the defense challenge,
also known as a Batson l9 challenge, and found that the trial court was
correct in holding a hearing to determine if jurors had been excluded
based on their association with an identifiable group. 20 The California
Court of Appeal revisited the trial court's findings and concluded that the
challenges were '''based on individual predilections supported by the
record.",21 The Court of Appeal recognized that the trial court made no
findings on the sincerity of the prosecutor's motivations, but held that
great deference was to be given to the trial court in "'distinguishing bona
fide reasons from sham excuses., .. 22 The Court of Appeal concluded that
the trial court could reasonably have found, given several race-neutral
explanations, that the prosecutor's motives were not racial or ethnic. 23
The California Supreme Court denied Kesser and Leahy's petitions
without comment. 24 The couple then sought a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.c. § 2254, on the ground the prosecutor's use of
peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
[d.
[d.
16 [d.
14

15

17

[d. at 356.

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 2006).
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
20Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing People v. Chiara, No.
A060502, slip op. at 17 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12,1995».
21 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 356 (quoting Chiara, No. A060502, slip op. at 20).
22 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 356 (quoting Chiara, No. A060502, slip op. at 19).
23 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 356-57.
24 People v. Chiara, No. S051306 (Cal. Mar. 14, 1996).
18

19 Batson
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Fourteenth Amendment. 25 The district court that reviewed the claim also
denied the petitions and found that "although the trial court 'commit[ed]
serious error in failing to recognize the bias inherent in one of the
prosecutor's purportedly neutral reasons,' the court of appeal acted
appropriately in finding that 'race was not the primary reason given by
the prosecutor. ",26
The Ninth Circuit originally affirmed the district court in a divided
decision, then granted a rehearing en banc and reversed. 27
II.

EN BANC

NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

A.

THE COURT'S DUTY TO EVALUATE THE CREDIBILITY AND
LEGITIMACY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

When there are questions surrounding the discriminatory
motivations behind a peremptory challenge, a party can request a Batson
hearing. 28 Under Batson, the party that exercised the peremptory
challenge "'must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his
legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges'" and the court's
findings "'largely will turn on evaluation of credibility. ",29 The Ninth
Circuit explained that even in a "mixed-motive analysis" (where a
challenger articulates both race-based and race-neutral reasons), when
there are blatant race-based strikes Batson is not "toothless. ,,30 "Once an
inference of race-based challenges has been established, the court need
not accept any nonracial excuse that comes along.,,3!

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2006).
(citing Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992. 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Kesser v. Cambra, No. C-96-3452-PJH 2001 WL 1352607, *8-13
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,2001) (unpublished disposition».
27 Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 425 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir.
2005), rev'd en bane, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006).
28 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). California's equivalent of a Batson hearing is a
Wheeler hearing. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (rejected by Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), to the extent Wheeler conflicts with federal law). See also supra
note 8.
29 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,98 n.20-21 (1986».
30 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358. The "mixed-motive analysis" was advocated by Circuit Judge
Wardlaw in her concurrence in this case. See id. at 371-76; see also infra notes 77-84 and
accompanying text.
31 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,358 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d
1327,1331 (9th Cir. 1993».
25

26 [d.
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Batson Test

"A Batson challenge involves a three-part test. First, the defendant
must make a prima facie showing that a challenge was based on race.
Second, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for the challenge.
Third, the court must determine whether the defendant has shown
'purposeful discrimination .... 32
If the prosecution has put forth race-neutral reasons under the
second step in Batson, "the court is required to evaluate 'the
persuasiveness of the justification.... 33 "The question is not whether the
stated reason represents a sound strategic judgment, but 'whether
counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be
believed.",34 "'While subjective factors may playa legitimate role in the
exercise of challenges, reliance on such factors alone cannot overcome
strong objective indicia of discrimination .......35
It is the duty of the prosecutor to give a "'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges.,,36 The reasons must be related to the case being tried. 37
"[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.,,38 "'[W]hen there is
reason to believe that there is racial motivation for the challenge, neither
the trial courts nor [Circuit Courts of Appeal] are bound to accept at face
value a list of neutral reasons that are either unsupported in the record or
refuted by it .... 39 There is no need for the court to find "all nonracial
reasons pretextual in order to find racial discrimination. ,.40
2.

Comparative Juror Analysis
The court can also conduct a "comparative analysis" of a stricken

32 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767
(1995) (per curiam) ("If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step
three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.")).
33 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,768 (1995)).
34 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)
(plurality opinion)).
35 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994)).
36 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986)
(quoting Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,258 (1981))).
37 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,359 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
38 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).
39 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (citing Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.1993)).
40 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360.
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juror with an impaneled juror. 41 In the present case, the majority found
particularly apt the "comparative juror analysis," which it noted was a
long-approved circuit approach that the United States Supreme Court
recently applied in Miller-El v. Dretke. 42 Under a comparative analysis,
a '''prosecutor's motives may be revealed as pretextual where a given
explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different race who was
not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge. ",43 The Ninth
Circuit noted that the California appellate court may not have engaged in
a comparative analysis because California case law provides "that neither
the court of appeal nor the trial court need 'compare the responses of
rejected and accepted jurors to determine the bona fides of the
justifications offered.",44 However, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
California courts might want to revisit this issue in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Miller-El v. Dretke. 45
B.

APPLICATION OF BATSON AND THE COMPARATIVE JUROR ANALYSIS

In Kesser, the Ninth Circuit majority held that the California court
failed to consider the evidence before it and "unreasonably accepted [the
prosecutor's] nonracial motives as genuine.,,46
The majority held that the prosecutor's racial animus behind his
strikes was clear. 47 The prosecutor's "race-neutral" reasons were "only a
veneer, a pleasing moss having no depth"; therefore the court went on to
consider individually each of the prosecutor's stated reasons for
exercising his challenges. 48
The majority concluded, given the
prosecutor's testimony, that he had an obvious fixation with Native
4\ See id.; see also Miller-EI v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824
(9th CiT. 2003); McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Marshall, 121
F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir.
1989).
42 See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005);
supra note 4.
43 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McClain v. Prunty, 217
F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000». See also United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th
CiT. 1989) (finding pretext where the prosecution claimed it struck a Hispanic juror on account of his
residence, but did not strike a non-Hispanic juror with the same residence).
44 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360 (quoting People v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1996»; see also
People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047 (Cal. 1989).
45 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360 n.3 (citing Miller-EI v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) (holding
that "[i]f a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a [minority] panelist applies just as well to an
otherwise-similar [nonminority] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove
purposeful discrimination to be considered at Balson 's third step"».
46 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358.
47 Id. at 357.
48 Id. at 362-71.
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Americans and went on to strike the remaining Native Americans in the
panel. 49 He then struck the only other minority in the venire, Flordeliza
Nakata, whom he also described in his notes as "brown skinned.,,5o The
jury that was ultimately selected was an all-white jury.51

1.

Debra Rindels, a Native American Woman

When questioned about his peremptory challenge to eliminate
Debra Rindels, the prosecutor "answered using blatant racial and cultural
stereotypes.,,52 He identified Rindels in his notes and to the court as a
"darker skinned" "Native American female.,,53 He then went on to
express his fears that Native Americans were resistive and suspicious of
the criminal justice system. 54 He stated that she was "pretentious" for
thinking she was the only one at her job that could complete her tasks. 55
He also felt that Rindels was living in a dysfunctional family because her
daughter had been molested by Rindels' father. 56
The majority conducted a comparative analysis of questionnaire
responses by other potential jurors in the Kesser case and found
impaneled jurors with many of the same characteristics that Rindels was
dismissed for having. 57 Ultimately, the majority found that Rindels "was
not emotional about, resistive to, or suspicious of the system," unlike
some other jurors. 58
The majority's analysis uncovered other jurors who appeared
"pretentious" from their answers but were not struck by the prosecutor. 59
It also found impaneled members of the jury in dysfunctional family
situations who were accepted by the prosecutor.60 The court concluded
that

In light of the record, the prosecutor's facially plausible
explanations are "severely undercut by the prosecution's
failure to object to other panel members who expressed
49

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2006).

50

/d.
Id. at 358.

5!

Id. at 357.
1d.
54
1d.
55 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 362 (9th Cir. 2006).
56 Id. at 365.
57 /d . at 362-68.
58 1d. at 365.
59 1d. at 362-63.
60 Id. at 366.
52
53
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views much like [Rindels's]. The fact that [a given] reason
also applied to these other panel members, most of them
white, none of them struck, is evidence of pretext.,,61
Given his clearly pretextual reasons, the prosecutor failed to meet
his non-racial obligation under Batson. 62 Thus, the evidence in the
Kesser case was '''too powerful to conclude anything but
discrimination. ,,,63
2.

Theresa Lawton and Carla Smithfield, Native American Women

Although the evidence of "racial animus [was] most obvious with
respect to Rindels," the prosecutor's treatment of the other two Native
Americans was consistent. 64 He identified Lawton and Smithfield, along
with Rindels, as "the darkest skinned women that I saw on the panel.,,65
Of the prosecutor's five stated reasons for striking Lawton, only one, the
length of her commute, appeared legitimate given a comparative juror
. 66
anaI YSIS.
The prosecutor dismissed Smithfield because her husband was a
recovered alcoholic and he feared she would sympathize with the
defendant. 67 The majority found this case-specific reason logical, but
after further inquiry non-genuine. 68 In light of the comparative juror
analysis other jurors had personally experienced problems with
alcoholism and might have just as easily sympathized with the defendant,
but were not excused from the panel. 69 In addition to Smithfield's
husband's condition, the prosecutor also claimed he struck her because
she was concerned with leaving her job as a school teacher, a concern
shared by other impaneled jurors. 70
61 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 367 (9th CiT. 2006) (quoting Miller-EI v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 248 (2005)).
62 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 364.

63
64
65

,d.

ld. at 368.
ld. at 369.

66 ld. at 370. The prosecutor's other reasons included: (I) being married to a man who had to
pay child support; (2) receiving a speeding ticket and a drunk driving arrest; (3) following a murder
trial in which Kesser's defense attorney secured an acquittal; and (4) being "weak" and not overly
educated. ld. at 369. Each of Lawton's personal characteristics was held by some of the impaneled
jurors, and, by contrast, one other impaneled juror "actually knew Kesser's counsel." [d. (emphasis
in original).
67 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,370 (9th CiT. 2006).
68 ,d.
69

70

ld. at 370-71.
ld. at 371.
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Flordeliza Nakata, Possibly a Filipina Woman

Although a Batson challenge was not before the court in regards to
Ms. Nakata, the court found her strike relevant to the overall
71
determination of whether the prosecutor employed racial stereotypes.
The prosecutor's remarks about Nakata also indicated racial
stereotyping; he stated that she was the type to "walk two steps to the left
and one to the rear" which "smacks of racial and ethnic stereotypes of
the subservient Asian woman."n
While the record indicated that the prosecutor offered several raceneutral reasons for striking Lawton, Smithfield, and Nakata, his
pretextual explanations ultimately undercut his credibility.73

4.

Conclusion

Aware that the California Court of Appeal must be given deference
in its findings of fact, the majority held that, taken as a whole, the record
showed that the prosecutor's non-racial reasons for challenging the jurors
at issue were pretextual and amounted to "sham excuse[s].,,74 State
courts have a duty under Batson's third step to "review the record to root
out such deceptions.,,75 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the state court's findings were unreasonable and granted the writ. 76
C.

DEPARTURE FROM A PURE COMPARATIVE JUROR ANALYSIS

1.

"Mixed-Motive Analysis": The Wardlaw, Paez, and Berzon
Concurring Opinion

Circuit Judge Kim M. Wardlaw wrote separately asserting that the
majority should have applied a "mixed-motive analysis" in the second or
third step of Batson according to applicable Supreme Court precedent. 77
Judge Wardlaw, with whom Circuit Judge Richard Paez and Circuit

Id. at 369 n.6.
Id. (citing Peter Kwan, Invention, Inversion, and Intervention: The Oriental Woman in The
World of Suzie Wong, M. Butterfly, and The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, 5 ASIAN
L.1.99, 100 (1998) ("The Oriental Woman is meek, shy, passive, childlike, innocent and naive. She
relies and is dependent on the white hero ....").
73 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,369 (9th Cir. 2006).
74 Id . at 371.
75
Id.
76
Id.
71

72

77

Id. at 371-72 (Wardlaw, J., concurring); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229. 239

(1976).
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Judge Marsha S. Berzon joined, stated that in situations where both racebased and race-neutral reasons were provided for striking a juror,
"Supreme Court precedent requires application of 'but for' mixed-motive
analysis to determine whether the strike violates the Equal Protection
Clause." 78
To illustrate, Judge Wardlaw provided an example of the
application of the "mixed-motive analysis":
Imagine a prosecutor considering using a strike against either an
African-American or a white venirewoman because each has a spouse
who has served time in prison. Imagine that the prosecutor ultimately
strikes the African-American woman instead of the white woman
because of her race. Although the stricken venirewoman' s experience
with the criminal justice system is the predominant motive driving the
strike, her race is the but-for cause. Thus a partially race-based strike
may pass the Court of Appeal's "predominant motive" standard but
fail mixed-motive analysis. Moreover, mixed-motive analysis shifts
the burden to the prosecutor to demonstrate that veniremembers would
have been challenged irrespective of their race .... 79
According to Judge Wardlaw, a mixed-motive analysis properly
shifts the burden to the prosecutor in cases where both race-based and
race-neutral reasons for a challenge exist. 80 The purpose of "but for"
analysis in mixed-motive cases is to prevent impermissible
discriminatory motivation, but to permit prosecutors to show that the
challenge would have been made even absent the impermissible
motivation (Le., "that the discriminatory motivation was not a 'but for'
cause of the challenged decision,,).81 By including the mixed-motive
analysis at either step two or step three of the Batson test, the prosecutor
would have to
demonstrate that he would have exercised the strike absent
[the] discriminatory motive. Either way, a court may not
allow a mixed-motive rationale to survive equal protection
scrutiny unless the prosecutor can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would have reached
the same decision even in the absence of impermissible

[d. at 372 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351,375 (9th Cir. 2006) (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
80 [d. at 372 (Wardlaw, 1., concurring).
81 [d.

78

79
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race-based motivation. S2
Moreover, Judge Wardlaw noted that every circuit that has decided
Batson cases involving mixed motives has come to the same
conclusion. s3 Consequently, Judge Wardlaw would have granted habeas
relief as a result of the California court's failure to apply mixed-motive
analysis. 84

2.

A Stricter Standard: The Berzon Concurring Opinion

Judge Berzon joined in the majority opinion and Judge Wardlaw's
persuasive concurrence but felt that the court was "restricted to deciding
whether the state court decision [was] contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, 'clearly established' Supreme Court law"
because this case arose as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. S5
Judge Berzon suggested that if this were a case arising on direct
appeal rather than habeas, she would hold that "in Batson cases, the
Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from exercising a
peremptory challenge to dismiss a juror whenever a motivating factor for
the dismissal is race-based, without permitting the prosecutor to establish
that he would have challenged the juror absent the race-based motive."s6
Thus the standard advocated by Judge Berzon is even higher than the one
advocated by Judge Wardlaw. s7

3.

"Dual Motivation Analysis" Does Not Require Solely Race-Neutral
Peremptory Challenges: The Dissent

Of particular concern to the dissent in Kesser was that the majority
employed a "comparative juror analysis" that was neither prescribed by

82/d. at 373 (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,98 (1986);
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dis!. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
83 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 373 (Wardlaw, J., concurring). See Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d
24, 27-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (remanding for correct application of mixed-motive analysis on habeas
review); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 232-35 (3d Cir. 2002) (approving correct application of
mixed-motive analysis on habeas review); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1530-32 (8th Cir.
1995) (approving correct application of mixed-motive analysis on direct review); Wallace v.
Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (approving correct application of
mixed-motive analysis on habeas review).
84 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 372 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
85 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 376 (9th Cir. 2006) (Berzon, J., concurring); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2254(d)(I) (West 2007).
86 [d. at 376-77 (Berzon, J., concurring).
87 [d. at 376 (Berzon, J., concurring).
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the Supreme Court nor raised by the parties below. 88 Circuit Judge
Pamela Ann Rymer, with whom Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain,
Chief Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Chief Judge Consuelo Callahan, and
Chief Judge Carlos T. Bea joined, disagreed with the majority's
"comparative juror analysis," noting that "the Supreme Court has never
held that the only permissible challenge is one that is based solely on
race-neutral reasons. Neither has the Court ever prescribed what test
must be applied when a peremptory challenge is based on mixed
prosecutorial motives.,,89 Thus, according to Judge Rymer, the decision
of the California Court of Appeal should have been affirmed. 90
Judge Rymer rejected Kesser's argument that the four race-neutral
reasons put forth by the prosecutor for dismissing Rindels did not matter
because "ethnicity can play no role in the jury selection process.,,91
Rather, the rule does not require that every reason be race-neutral. 92 In
fact, Judge Rymer noted that the Supreme Court "passed up the
opportunity to address a mixed motive challenge when it denied
certiorari in Wilkerson v. Texas, a case where the prosecutor admitted
that race was a factor in his peremptory strike.,,93 Therefore, since the
Supreme Court had not decided a case on point, the California Court of
Appeal decision in this case could not be "contrary to clearly established
federal law" as the majority concluded.94 Instead, the cases that have
addressed mixed-motive peremptory challenges have allowed some racebased reasons as long as the race-neutral reasons would have justified the
strike without the presence of the race-based factor. 95
See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 377 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
[d. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
90 [d. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
91 Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 381 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
92 [d. (Rymer, J., dissenting) (stating that "the [Supreme] Court has not said that the burden
at step two can only be mct if every reason is race-neutral") (emphasis in original).
93 [d. (Rymer, J., dissenting) (citing Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924 (1989)).
94 [d. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
95 [d. at 383 & n.6 (Rymer, J., dissenting). See also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (holding that if the claimant proves discriminatory motivation, the accused
party may show that the improper motivation was only part, and not the decisive part, of the
motivation); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 231- 35 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the state court's
application of dual motivation analysis to a Batson challenge did not result in a decision contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, federal law under § 2254(d)(l )); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417,
418-22 (4th Cu. 1995) (holding that if a party exercises a peremptory challenge in part for a
discriminatory purpose, a trial court must decide whether the party whose conduct is being
challenged has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike would have
nevertheless been exercised even if an improper factor had not motivated in part the decision to
strike); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1530-32 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court's
88

89
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The dissent also rejected Kesser's alternative argument that if a
mixed-motive analysis were proper, "the prosecutor did not show that he
would have exercised his challenge solely for race-neutral reasons.,,96
Regardless of how the mixed-motive analysis would have come out in
Kesser, Judge Rymer was not persuaded to reverse or remand on this
issue alone because she felt it was not the court's job at this stage to
determine whether a mixed-motive analysis was proper under Batson. 97
Instead, it was the court's job to determine "whether the California Court
of Appeal's decision was an unreasonable application of Batson. Its
approach could be incorrect (something which it is unnecessary to
decide), yet not be unreasonable.,,98
Instead, Judge Rymer reasoned that "the California Court of Appeal
allowed the strike on the basis of a number of racially neutral, nonpretextual reasons that were the primary reasons for the challenge . . .
[a]mount[ing] to a finding that the prosecutor would have exercised the
challenge even without the race-based reason.,,99 Therefore, she felt that
for purposes of habeas review, the California court did not unreasonably
apply federal law. 100
Furthermore, the fact that the majority partook in a "comparative
juror analysis" for which no evidence was presented and no arguments
were offered constituted a highly fact intensive process for a collateral
review which Judge Rymer felt was improper. 101 The majority did so
despite the fact that a "state court's finding of the absence of
discriminatory intent is a 'pure issue of fact' accorded significant
deference.,,102 The dissent instead reasoned that the California Court of
Appeal's finding that the prosecutor's race-based reasons for striking the
jurors were not his primary reasons was not without support in the
record. 103 Thus Judge Rymer concluded that the Ninth Circuit had no
decision to allow a strike on the basis of several racially neutral reasons. despite one reason that was
not racially neutral. was equivalent to a finding that the prosecutor would have exercised the strike
even without the one non-racially neutral motive).
96 Kesser. 465 F.3d at 383 (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
97 Kesser v. Cambra. 465 F.3d 35 1.383-84 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
98 1d. at 384 (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
99 Id. (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
100 Id. (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
101 Id. at 377 (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
102 Id. at 384 (Rymer. J .• dissenting) (quoting Miller-EI v. Dretke. 537 U.S. 322. 339 (2003».
"'Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. § 2254(e)(l). and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a
factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in
light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding ... • [d. (quoting Miller-El. 537 U.S. at
340).
103 Kesser v. Cambra. 465 F.3d 351.385 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer. J .• dissenting).
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place conducting a comparative juror analysis de novo and therefore the
opinion of the California Court of Appeal should have been affirmed. 104
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

In Kesser v. Cambra, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Batson test
and demonstrated the necessity of all three prongs to prevent
impermissible voir dire discrimination. The court confirmed that it
would not tolerate racial discrimination during the jury voir dire process
and demanded that state courts flush out pretextual excuses that disguise
discrimination. 105 The debate presented in Kesser between the majority,
the concurrences, and the dissent, involves the extent to which racebased reasons for exercising peremptory challenges will be tolerated
when race-neutral reasons are also presented. Applying a "comparative
juror analysis," the majority concluded that when an attorney presents
both race-neutral and race-based reasons for striking a juror, the strike
will not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as the race-neutral
reasons would have justified the strike without the presence of the racebased factor. 106
The most significant aspect of the Kesser decision is the Ninth
Circuit's recommendation that state courts apply the "comparative juror
analysis" during the third step of Batson as seen in Miller-El v. Dretke. 107
By evaluating the voir dire transcript and comparing an attorney's
reasons behind his or her challenges to the characteristics of impaneled
jurors, state courts are arguably better equipped to identify pretextual
excuses. There is also a strong argument in Judge Wardlaw's concurring
opinion that a mixed-motive "but for" analysis should be adopted to
properly shift the burden of proving no improper motive to the
challenger in mixed-motive cases.108 Whether California courts will
adopt the majority's "comparative juror analysis" or the concurrence's
"mixed-motive analysis" remains to be seen. However, what is certain is
that racial discrimination cannot be the primary motive behind a
peremptory challenge and violations of the Equal Protection Clause will
not be tolerated.

104

1d.

See supra notes 28-76 and accompanying text.
Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359-71; see also supra notes 28-76 and accompanying text.
107 Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360 n.3; see also supra notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
lOB See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 371-76 (Wardlaw, J., concurring); see also supra notes 77-84 and
accompanying text.
105

106
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